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Direct Measures of Time Preference
LUIGI VENTURA*
Universita di Roma “La Sapienza”
Abstract: This work constitutes an attempt to estimate time preference factors in a direct way
from survey data, without relying on consumption data and on particular estimation techniques.
By using microeconomic data obtained from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (for the year 2000) and a simple second order Taylor expansion of a generic utility function
we will compute, for each agent, a utility discount factor. The interesting features of the dataset
will also enable us to relate discount factors to a large number of social, economic, and
demographic variables. Agents do appear to discount future utility flows at rates which vary
across age, education, civil status, income and wealth situations; more importantly, it is suggested




hy do people discount utility of future consumption? Or, why are people
impatient? This is a question which has been raised several times in 
the literature and in policy debates, and which remains fundamentally
unanswered.
Of course, we are not wondering about the reasons why an agent with an
uneven distribution of endowments across time periods should try to make
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consumption have largely been explored, at least since the work of Böhm-
Bawerk (1959), and still constitute the focus of interesting theoretical and
empirical work. 
The problem which is addressed in this paper is, rather, the following: why
should people with a smooth distribution of resources and with time
independent preferences prefer to anticipate consumption, that is, be
impatient. This attitude, known as pure time preference, since the work of
Irving Fisher (1930) is, in a sense, a more fundamental one, and is the focus
of this research.
There have been many attempts, in the literature, to assess the magnitude
of time preference parameters, but these have been mostly based on the
estimation of Euler equations for rates of growth of consumption (as, for
example, in Lawrance (1991) and in Dynan (1993)) or experimental data (see,
for a recent example, Anderhub et al. (2001)).
The estimation procedure presents some limitations and drawbacks: first
of all, it relies on specific functional forms for utility functions, and on
hypotheses about separability, additivity, etc. Second, it postulates a correct
assessment of interest rates, which enter in a non trivial way in the Euler
equations. Using one measure of interest rate rather than another is very
likely to strongly affect the results of the estimation. Last but not least,
estimating Euler equations assumes that first order conditions for optimal
consumption hold, which is not the case if there are frictions in the markets
for capital (and/or goods).
On a distinct ground of criticism, recent research papers (Ludvigson and
Paxon (2001) and Carroll (2001)), have shown that linear approximations to
Euler equations (which is implied by linear regressions of Euler equations)
might be affected by a potentially important approximation bias.
In this work a new, more direct approach to the assessment of time
preference parameters will be introduced, which is based upon the use of
recently released data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Households Income
and Wealth (SHIW) for the year 2000.
In the framework of Samuelson (1937) discounted utility model and under
somewhat milder assumptions on the structure of preferences (in particular,
without imposing any restriction on the shape of individuals’ instantaneous
utility function) it will be possible to derive intertemporal preference factors
by using a simple quadratic Taylor series expansion.
As this will be done on a very large group of (2,228) individuals, it will also
be possible to split the sample according to age and other social and
demographic dimensions and check the dynamics of time preference. More-
over, in an effort to better assess the relevance of various factors which might
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estimation and derive interesting conclusions, that will suggest avenues for
future research.
A novel feature of the analysis consists in the fact that our data also allow
us to compute, at least locally, the curvature of utility functions, which will
make it possible both to account for concavity of utility in the computation of
time preference parameters, and to establish some interesting links between
those parameters and others, governing agents’ attitudes towards risk (in
particular the coefficient of absolute risk aversion).
The rest of the work is organised as follows: Section II contains a brief
review of literature; Section III introduces the model used to compute time
preference parameters. Section IV illustrates the results obtained for various
groups of agents; Section V presents the results of a Tobit estimation, relating
time preference to some variables of interest. Section VI concludes, with some
final remarks.
II LITERATURE
That agents may display pure time preference might seem irrational, as it
was suggested by various distinguished theorists (Jevons, 1965; Marshall,
1920; Pigou, 1932; Ramsey, 1928; just to cite a few), but even casual
empiricism or personal experience suggest this is indeed the case. Most people
are impatient, to a smaller or larger degree, and most evaluate differently the
benefits derived from consumption at different stages of life. Why this is so, is
still an open question.
Acertain number of alternative theories have recently been put forward to
provide tentative answers to the existence of positive rates of time preference,
of which a very comprehensive and detailed survey can be found in the recent
work by Frederick et al. (2002). Some authors (like Hansson and Stuart, 1990
and Rogers, 1994) impute discounting to some sort of evolutionary dynamics,
in the sense that agents discounting little or much could be the winners in
some kind of “evolutionary contexts”.
Others, as in Posner (1995), argue that a single economic agent contains,
in some sense, many “selves”, corresponding to different periods or situations
in lifetime, and that the weight attached to some (typically the ones
corresponding to situations in the more distant future) of these “selves” will
normally be smaller than the one attached to others. Others still, (as is the
case in Becker and Mulligan (1997)) invoke a rational “defective recognition of
future utilities” to explain this phenomenon.
Quite recently, a new intriguing theory presented by Trostel and Taylor
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function, as it is often called) varies with age, as the ability of individuals to
enjoy consumption is very likely to vary during the course of life. Therefore,
while ruling out the existence of an intrinsic preference for present
consumption, this theory would allow for positive rates of time preference on
the grounds that people tend to rationally devalue consumption in periods of
low expected felicity.
More recently some contributions (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991 and
Keren and Roelofsma, 1995) have in some way linked time preference to
uncertainty, suggesting that impatience might be linked to uncertainty of
future prospects. Recent empirical work by Anderhub et al. (2001), based on
experimental data, offers some support to this view.
The issue of uncertainty is also obviously related to market in-
completeness, under which individuals are prevented from redistributing
resources across states of the world and periods of time, or both. The
relationship between utility discounting and uncertainty, or attitudes towards
risk, should therefore carry over to market incompleteness or incomplete
market participation. 
A related, though distinct, question concerns the dynamics of time
preference. It is certainly interesting and policy relevant to assess the
variability of impatience across age and other social and demographic
dimensions. Many of the theories of intertemporal preference (including the
above mentioned) bear some implication about the dynamics of utility
discounting, especially for what concerns variability across age. Once again,
however, the implications and the relative empirical tests (when available) are
far from unambiguous. Some studies (Cropper et al., 1994; Yaari, 1965;
Attanasio et al., 1995; Trostel and Taylor, 2001) suggest that the rate of time
preference falls and then rises (sometimes dramatically) with age. Others
(Rogers, 1994; Posner, 1995; Becker and Mulligan, 1997) indicate that a
somewhat inverse pattern might also emerge.
The analysis that follows will also shed some additional light onto these
matters, and show interesting dynamics of time preference parameters across
age, risk, education, and other important variables.
III THE MODEL
To get a quantitative idea of time preference parameters we are going to
use the answers to two questions which were asked of family heads in the most
recent (year 2000) wave of the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) run every two years on a very large number of households.
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been told you won 10 million lire, that you will be able to cash, for sure, in a
year. What is the most you are prepared to pay to immediately get the 10
million lire?”
The second question we are going to use, number E13, asks the following:
“And if the 10 million lire were only available in two years, what is the most
you would be prepared to pay to get them immediately?”
The respondents can either specify a monetary amount, or declare they do
not know, or simply refuse to answer.
To  understand the way we can use the answers to those questions to
estimate discount factors, let us suppose we are dealing with agents having
preferences represented, at a time t, by a time additive, but otherwise generic
intertemporal utility function of the kind Ut(w)=Σ
t
u(ws), where ws is a given
s=t
level of wealth enjoyed in year s.
Having defined instantaneous utility u(w) over wealth we are implicitly
assuming a sort of derived (or indirect) utility function, which accounts for
immediate consumption as well as for the share of wealth which will generate
consumption in all the subsequent periods. However, as will become clear in
the sequel, we will not explicitly consider the level of wealth w in our
calculations, which means that we might as well have defined instantaneous
utility over income or total consumption without substantially affecting the
results of the analysis.
More importantly, we suppose that agents discount the utility derived
from consumption at a date s > t using a factor β s–t, which will be contained
within the unit interval.
By interpreting the answers to question E12 and E13 as reservation prices
(which we will denote, in the sequel, by x1 and x2) over which agents would
turn down the offer of anticipating the delivery of the ten million lire, and
assuming agents own (or, rather, that they think they will own) the same level
of income, w, for two or, respectively, three consecutive periods, we can set the
following equalities (where the time index has been omitted, for simplicity):
u(w + 10 – x1) + β u(w) = u(w) + β u(w + 10) (1)
for the first question and 
u(w + 10 – x2) + β u(w) + β2 u(w) = u(w) + β u(w) + β2 u(w + 10) (2)
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lire).
We may immediately notice that all the other terms in the summation of
instantaneous utilities have been eliminated (as they are irrelevant to the
choice under analysis) and that expression (2) can be further simplified into:
u(w + 10 – x2) + β2 u(w) = u(w) + β2 u(w + 10) (3)
In writing expressions (1) and (2) it is apparent that we are implicitly
assuming that the discount factor remains constant for at least two years,
which seems a relatively mild assumption.
From (1) and (3) it is easy to realise that β = 1 when x1 = x2 = 0. Let us now
concentrate on the interesting case in which we have: x2 > x1 > 0.
A second order Taylor series expansion around the point w of (1) and (3)
yields, respectively:
u(w) – u'(w)(10 – x1) + 0.5u"(w)(10 – x1)2 + βu(w) =
u(w) + β [u(w) + 10u'(w) + 50u"(w)] (4)
and 
u(w) – u'(w)(10 – x1) + 0.5u"(w)(10 – x1)2 + β2u(w) =
u(w) + β2 [u(w) + 10u'(w) + 50u"(w)] (5)
which can be further simplified and rearranged, with some algebraic
manipulations, into:
[10u'(w) + 50u"(w)](1 – β) = u'(w)x1 + u"(w)(10x1 – 0.5x12) (6)
and 
[10u'(w) + 50u"(w)](1 – β2) = u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10x2 – 0.5x22). (7)
The interpretation of Equations (6) and (7) is quite immediate: the left
hand side represents the net utility gain from getting in advance the proposed
amount of money (10 million lire). The right hand side, on the other hand,
represents the cost that one has to bear to get the money in advance (i.e. x1 or
x2). The net gain must be at least as great as the net benefit, to induce an
agent into offering x1 or x2, in order to immediately obtain the money.
It is also clear that given our assumption about the constancy of β for the
two periods, we have to consider expressions (6) and (7) as two equations in
two unknowns, β and u(w), in order to get a unique solution.
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(1 – β2) u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10x2 – 0.5x22)
––––––  = –––––––––––––––––––––– ––– (8)
(1 – β) u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10x1 – 0.5x22)
which can be further simplified as:
u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10x2 – 0.5x22)
β = –––––––––––––––––––––––– – 1 (9)
u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10x1 – 0.5x22)
Expression (9) is very close to our final result, as it expresses the factor of
time preference as a function of first and second derivatives of the utility
function and of the monetary quantities x1 and x2.
It is worth noticing the importance of considering the curvature of the
utility function in correctly assessing agents’ degree of (pure) time preference.
As marginal utility increases as income decreases, we have total utility going
down at an increasing rate as x1 (or x2) increases. Disregarding the curvature
of utility functions, therefore, could lead to a serious underestimation of time
preference. 
If we possessed information about the curvature of agents’ utility, it would
be very easy to recover (9) in terms of observables.
In fact, let us denote by A(w) the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and
by k = –A(w) the opposite of this coefficient. Therefore, the following holds:
u"(w)
k = ––– ––, which implies: u"(w) = ku'(w),
u'(w)
Substituting the latter expression into expression (9) we obtain:
u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10 – 0.5x22)          [x2 + k(10x2 – 0.5x22)]
β = ––––––––––––––––––––––– – 1 = –––––––––––––––––– – 1 (10)
u'(w)x2 + u"(w)(10 – 0.5x22)          [x1 + k(10x1 – 0.5x12)]
which is an expression we can use to compute β out of our data. 
Of course, we will not be allowed to apply expression (10) to all (x1, x2)
pairs, as a cursory examination of the formula reveals. In particular,
expression (10) is not defined for x1 = x2 = 0 (though the limit is clearly seen to
be 1, using De l’Hospital’s rule). In this case, however, we already know that 
β = 1. Moreover, expression (10) cannot be applied when x2 ≤ x1. In such a case
our formula would either yield a negative number, or zero, which could not be
interpreted as a signal of very low, or negative, time preference factors, but
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(see also, for a comprehensive survey, the work by Frederick et al. (2002)).
Expression (10) cannot be applied, as well, when x2 is much larger than x1, in
a way which is not compatible with fixed (across one or two periods) discount
factors and exponential discounting. In this case our formula would return a
value of β larger than one, which of course should not be interpreted in the
sense of assigning more weight to the future than to the present (in such a case
we should observe negative values for x1 or x2, which we never do in our data-
set).
With these caveats in mind, we may now turn to the computation of
individuals’ coefficients of absolute risk aversion, which is possible using our
micro data. To do so, we use the answers to the following hypothetical question
posed by the Central Bank in its 2000 survey (question E14): “You are offered
the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with equal
probabilities, either to gain 10 million lire or to lose all the capital invested.
What is the most you are prepared to pay for this security?” The answer to this
question is, again, a reservation price, above which the investor rejects the
offer. Denoting the reservation price by z, an unfavourable state of nature
results in income of w – z, a favourable state results in w – z + 10, and expected
income is w – z + 5, where all values are again measured in millions of lire.
Following Guiso and Paiella (2001) and Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003), who
used this question to obtain a measure of risk aversion, it is quite easy to show
that: 
10 – 2z
A(w) = – U"(w)/U'(w) = ––––––––––– (11)
50 – 10z + z2
where, again, a second order Taylor expansion (this time around w) has been
used to obtain the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It may be worth
noticing that expression (11) has been computed by considering the 10 million
lire at stake as a gross gain, i.e. not taking into account the price of the lottery,
z. Alternatively, as in Guiso and Paiella (2001), the reward might be
considered as a net gain, which would ultimately lead to a slightly different
expression for (11). However, as it was claimed in Eisenhauer and Ventura
(2003), there are good reasons to stick to either interpretation, and since the
adoption of one or the other version does not affect the results of the
subsequent analysis in a substantial way, only expression (11) will be used. 
A remark is worth making. It can be easily checked that as z  varies
between 0 and w the coefficient of absolute risk aversion varies between 0.20
and – 0.20 (negative risk aversion identifies a risk lover). In particular, this
means that absolute risk aversion will never exceed the upper limit of 0.20,
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coefficient of risk aversion higher than the upper limit, and our data are not
such to reveal it. On average, therefore, we could think that the measures of
absolute risk aversion we get from (11) will underestimate the true
coefficients, but they will still be useful for our main purpose.
In fact, by setting k = – A(w) we can evaluate expression (10) for all the
individuals in our sample. Now, taking the first derivative of (10) with respect
to k, yields:
∂β 0.5x2(x1 – x2)
––– = ––––––––––––––––– (12)
∂k [1 + k(10 – 0.5x1)]2x1
as x1 and x2 are both positive and x2 ≥ x1.
In view of (12) and of the previous comments about the potential
downward bias in our measure of absolute risk aversion, we can expect β to be,
on average, underestimated (nevertheless, we should also consider the fact
that the bias affects the second order term of the Taylor approximation). 
IV A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT DATA
Our initial sample consisted of 3,933 people, from the year 2000 Survey of
Household Income and Wealth, all of whom were asked questions E12, E13
and E14.  Out of this group of people, we eliminated 696 individuals as they
either declared not to know the answer, or simply refused to answer questions
E12 and E13. On the other hand, also in the case of question E14 some (just
20) agents refused to answer the question and some declared they did not
know the answer. A total of 3,193 household heads did answer the question,
and for 2,020 of them the answer was z = 0. Only agents reporting z ≥ 0 were
kept in the final sample. Furthermore, for some 308 cases we had x1 = 0 and
x2 ≥ 0. As the magnitude of x2 was in most cases such to dispel the idea of a
sort of threshold effect at work (whereby agents would recognise the difference
in utility only over a two-years horizon and not on a one year horizon) we
discarded those units from the sample (i.e. the response of those agents was
attributed to lack of understanding or to a different discounting behaviour).
Finally, deleting from the sample all the agents who reported a value of 
x1 ≥ x2 and all the agents for whom the difference between x1 and x2 was such
to yield a value β > 1 (in view of the remarks following the derivation of
expression (10), in Section III), we were left with a total of 2,228 cases, which
is still a large number, compared to the samples used in the previous
contributions to this stream of literature.
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could say that just about 10 per cent of the whole sample feature discount
factors range from 0.03 to 0.5, whereas about 87 per cent of the sample display
discount factors larger than 0.7. 
In Table 1 below, are reported the main results of the calculations carried
out on these survey data, according to the model presented in the previous
section, and performed over a large number of different subgroups. The first
column contains the description of the particular socio-demographic group
under investigation. The other two columns contain, respectively: the size of
the group and the mean value (within each group) of the average factor of time
preference, β.
Table 1. Discount Factors Across Different Socio-demographic Groups
Group Size β Group Size β
All 2,228 0.904
Men 1,512 0.910 Household = 1 402 0.880
Women 716 0.891 Household = 2 590 0.907
Age <= 30 81 0.790 Household = 3 526 0.900
30 < Age <= 40 366 0.915 Household = 4 512 0.927
40 < Age <= 50 467 0.910 Household > 4 198 0.894
50 < Age <= 60 481 0.910 Employee 777 0.908
60 < Age <= 70 421 0.914 Self-employed 302 0.912
Age > 70 412 0.893 Unemployed 58 0.867
Elem. school 626 0.891 Housewife 184 0.906
Middle school 580 0.892 Retired 894 0.900
High school 665 0.922 Northern residents 951 0.924
College 216 0.926 Central residents 488 0.905
Married 1,558 0.911 Southern residents 789 0.878
Unmarried 232 0.873 Wealth < 100mm 680 0.864
Divorced 123 0.888 Wealth >= 100mm  1,548 0.921
Widower 315 0.898 Income < 20mm  235 0.847
Home owners 1,565 0.918 Income >= 20mm  1,993 0.910
Renters 423 0.855 Mortgage holder 154 0.923
No Mortgage 1,092 0.916
A rapid inspection of Table 1 reveals interesting information as to the
dynamics of the utility discount factor across relevant dimensions such as:
gender, age, level of education, civil status, size of the household, job type, area
of residence, income and wealth situation and credit availability.
First of all, we may notice that the magnitude of time preference factors is
very much in line with results of other recent studies. In fact, our β’s have an
overall average of 0.904 and a standard deviation of 0.207. In Lawrance
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Focusing upon the various socio-demographic groups in which we have
divided our sample, it is possible to recognise some interesting patterns. 
If time preference does not seem to vary much across genders, we can also
immediately notice that utility discounting is not constant across classes of
age. In particular, very young (up to thirty years old) individuals seem to be
particularly impatient, as they heavily discount future consumption. At the
upper end of the age scale (>85) agents behave in quite an opposite way (i.e.
they display very little discounting). This is in open contrast with the recent
theory of “life cycle” discounting (Trostel and Taylor, 2001), very rapidly
sketched in the introduction, which would definitely imply an opposite
empirical implication (i.e. very low, or even negative, discounting for young
people and very high discounting for the very elderly).
For intermediate age classes, corresponding to the mature phases of
adulthood (which often entail the establishment of a family with children and
heavier duties), discounting remains roughly constant at a “normal rate” up
until a pre-retirement age, where it increases again. This is indeed the phase
of life cycle in which people accumulate more.
Figure 1 plots the factor of time preference β against classes of age, and
has been drawn dividing the whole sample into sub samples of five years each
(from 25 to 85 years and a final group of older people). The graph confirms the
picture that we depicted in the previous paragraph, of a non monotonic
relationship between age and time preference.
It also turns out that time preference is not constant across levels of
education. In fact, less educated people appear to be discounting future
consumption at a somewhat higher rate than better educated people (as β
ranges from a low value of 0.891 to a higher than average value of 0.926). This
finding might be considered as fairly counterintuitive, in as much as a higher
level of education provides a better insurance for future consumption (as it is
usually associated to better prospects of future income and wealth) and might
be thought to induce people into willing to consume more today (as tomorrow
more and maybe better consumption opportunities will be available). On the
other hand, a higher level of education also means less “defective recognition
of future utilities” (to quote again Becker and Mulligan, 1997), which should
bring about a smaller amount of discounting.
Unmarried and divorced people appear to discount future more than
married people; this might be considered as further evidence that uncertain
future prospects (and lack of some kind of natural insurance, provided by the
family itself) plays a fundamental role in determining impatience.
The rate of time preference also varies with family size, increasing as the
size of the household grows from one to four members, and decreasing
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future consumption more than other categories of agents and this, again,
points at the decisive role played by uncertainty in determining time
preference. It also seems possible to provide a rough geographical character-
isation of impatience, in as much as people residing in the north of Italy seem
to be more patient than people living in regions of the centre; the latter, in
turn, seem to be more patient than those living in the south and in the islands.
As could be expected, time preference factors also vary according to income
and wealth. In fact, worse off agents (both in terms of income and in terms of
wealth) feature lower discount factors than more affluent agents. This is quite
close to what has been suggested in previous empirical works. (Lawrance,
1991), for instance, finds a strong negative correlation between rates of time
preference and labour income or levels of education (which is consistent, at
least to some extent, with our results). Various explanations have been put
forward to justify this negative relationship. On the one hand, impatience
might reduce investment in education, which will directly translate into lower
income prospects. On the other hand, strong time preference might be deeply
rooted (also for cultural reasons) in less affluent classes of people (as was
suggested by Maital and Maital, 1977). If capital markets are imperfect,
moreover, and do not allow for borrowing against future labour income (which
is often the case), less patient people might opt for careers with flat (and lower)
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Figure 1: Age and Time Preferencewage paths, as opposed to others offering relatively low wages at the outset
and much higher wages later on.
That time preference should not be constant across income and wealth had
also been observed by Fisher (1930), who noted that small income levels would
produce high rates of impatience, partly from “lack of foresight and self-
control” and partly because agents would think that “provision for the present
is necessary both for the present itself and the future as well”.
Referring back to Table 1 we may also notice that time preference is also
variable with respect to another important variable related to family wealth,
namely a dummy variable indicating whether households own the place of
residence, or simply rent it. As it might have been expected, in view of the
effect that uncertainty seems to play on utility discounting, house owners are
more patient than those renting their dwellings. Finally, we explored the
dynamics of utility discounting with respect to a variable related to credit
availability. The fact of having had, in the past, an opportunity to access the
credit market, represented by the mere fact of holding a mortgage, does not
appear to substantially affect time preference factors, as revealed by the last
two rows of Table 1. This will be contrasted, in the next section, with the
effects on time preference parameters of being (or perceiving to be) credit
constrained.
V TIME PREFERENCE: A TOBIT ANALYSIS
Having explored, though only in a rather qualitative way, the dynamics of
time discounting with respect to various socio-economic factors, we may turn
to a more structured investigation of the determinants of pure time
preference. To do so, we need an estimation technique which may account for
both the effect of independent variables onto the probability of agents’
displaying positive rates of time preference (β < 1) and their effect onto the
relative magnitude of such coefficients. A Tobit analysis was therefore
performed, whose results are contained in Table 2.
As independent variables, also in view of the previous, qualitative,
statistical investigation, we chose to include the following: age, area of
residence, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (computed according to
expression (10)), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the head of the household
(who is the one who answers questions E12-E14) or some other member of the
household held a life insurance contract, and zero otherwise, household size,
sex, education, a variable representing financial constraints affecting the
household, and total wealth. Two more dummies, AREA2 and AREA3 take
value one, respectively, when the unit resides in the Centre and, respectively,
DIRECT MEASURES OF TIME PREFERENCE 305the South (including islands) of the Italian peninsula. The dummy variable
corresponding to residing in the North is, of course, the intercept.
The variable that we use to measure the extent of financial constraints is
a dummy related to the following question (C68 in the original numbering of
the year 2000 questionnaire): “In 2000 did you or another member of your
household consider the possibility of applying to a bank or a financial company
for a loan or a mortgage but then change his/her mind thinking that the
application would be rejected?” The dummy takes value one if the answer to
the question is affirmative, and zero otherwise. A unit value could therefore be
taken to indicate the presence of (perceived) financial constraints. 
As should be clear from a quick visual inspection of Table 2, the Tobit
regression yields an extremely low coefficient of determination, which
indicates a very large degree of variability in data. It is nonetheless instructive
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SAMPLE 1:2228to look at the sign and probability values of the various estimated coefficients.
As could be expected from the analysis of Section III, the variable “age”
enters positively in the regression, and this should be imputed to the dynamics
of time discounting in the early stages of agents’ working life. The coefficients
of the variable “AREA2” and AREA3 are negative and of increasing absolute
magnitude (though that of AREA2 is not statistically significant), indicating
that as we move from the North to the Centre and to the South the probability
of an agent’s displaying a positive rate of time preference increases, as well as
the absolute magnitude of the coefficient (as the intercept represents the
dummy variable for Northern residents, the coefficients of the AREA2 and
AREA3 dummies must be interpreted as differences relative to the intercept).
This is particularly interesting, in view of the fact that we do observe higher
degrees of capital accumulation in the North than in the Centre and in the
South.
The two variables related to risk, “RISK AVERSION” and “LIFE
INSURANCE” also display negative coefficients. Both variables are of
interest, as they need not be highly correlated; many risk averse individuals,
and in fact most of them, do not own a life insurance policy (for example,
because they are income constrained), whereas an individual possessing a life
insurance policy might in fact implicitly declare (from his or her answer to
question E14) a smaller coefficient of absolute risk aversion than other agents
who did not buy such a policy.
A positive coefficient is also attached to the variables household size and
sex (taking value 1 if male and 2 if female) suggesting that as household size
increases, household heads tend to be more patient (maybe accounting for the
other members’ preference satisfaction) and that women be relatively less
impatient than their male counterparts (although the variable SEX is not
significant in the regression).
The variables EDUCATION and WEALTH are also positively significant,
further backing our hypothesis of uncertainty driven utility discounting, also
in view of the considerations outlined in the previous section.
One of the most interesting variables to look at is, however, the one related
to financial constraints. The negative and highly significant coefficient
attached to it clearly indicates a role for market incompleteness in the
determination of time preference. People who do not have access to means of
redistributing income or consumption across time periods tend to discount
utility to a much greater extent than agents who are not so constrained. We
may notice, in passing, that this finding points at the role played by market
incompleteness even in the absence of uncertainty, as the variable
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS only relates to mortgage loans.
Our Tobit regressions were run under alternative hypothesis concerning
DIRECT MEASURES OF TIME PREFERENCE 307the underlying distribution function (normal, logistic, extreme value) and
yielded very similar results in all cases, which might be taken as an indication
of robustness.
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work constitutes a first attempt to gauge the importance of time
preference factors, using survey data provided by the Bank of Italy Survey of
Household Income and Wealth. The methodology used in this study to
compute time preference factors is a direct one, which does not make use of
econometric estimations, but of a simple second order Taylor expansion of an
intertemporal utility function.
It is maybe worth it, at this point, to illustrate some of the potential
advantages of this study over other comparable studies made using
experimental data. On the one hand, we have to consider the number of
individuals surveyed, which is of course by far larger than the number of
participants in any experimental study so far conducted. Second, agents have
been asked to answer a question related to their time preference in the course
of an extremely broad survey, in which they are asked to dwell on many other
aspects of their economic life including, for example, actual consumption,
working and investment activities, which in a sense establishes a link between
real life and hypothetical behaviour. Third, and more importantly, in the Bank
of Italy Survey time preference attitudes of agents are elicited together with
risk bearing attitudes, which allowed us to take into account the curvature of
the utility function in computing time discounting. Last, but not least, all the
information gathered in the Survey makes it possible to relate time preference
to a large number of factors, including risk and market incompleteness.
The magnitude of time preference factors seems, in any case, comparable
to that obtained in other recent econometric studies. The quantitative
importance of time preference is confirmed, as well as the fact that it is not
constant over a set of socio-demographic variables.
In particular, time preference is not constant over time, although it can be
considered approximately constant for a long period of agents’ lifetime. It is
not constant over income and wealth as well, as it was also suggested in
earlier works. The evidence reported in this study also points at a decisive role
played by uncertainty and market incompleteness over time preference
parameters, which should constitute an important topic for future research.
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